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OCD and Philosophy 
  
Obsessive-compulsives and philosophers have a lot in common. First if all, they 
are both compulsive doubters. They doubt the obvious. They rationalize their doing so 
by saying that they are trying to be rigorous and that they are trying not to believe 
things that are false. But that is, indeed, a mere rationalization. Both the obsessive-
compulsive and the philosopher are impotent, being too fearful to engage the world. 
And to the extent that they have potency, it lies in their ability to manipulate linguistic 
or otherwise symbolic proxies of reality. So instead of dealing with the world on its own 
terms---instead of dealing with the world in the world—they try to internalize as much 
of the world as possible into the sphere of their own thought, where they are dominant. 
And they are dominant there both because they are more inclined towards thought 
than towards action and also, more importantly, because it is their own mind where, of 
course, they ipso facto have total power. 
Or at least the illusion thereof—more on this in a moment. 
Then there is the fact that both the philosopher and the obsessive-compulsive 
are unduly preoccupied with logical niceties and fine points of argumentation. This is at 
least partly a derivative of their sense of impotence: when one has no material of one’s 
own to work on—which is the case whenever one is too afraid of the world to venture 
out into it and get material---one preoccupies oneself with secondary material—with 
matters of grammar, logic, argumentation and the like. 
Plus, by conditionalizing the acceptance of hypotheses on subtleties of proof and 
argumentation, they are able to rationalize continuing to remain in their own heads; 
they are able to rationalize commandeering debates, and holing them up within their 
own thought-scape, pending the resolution of niceties of logic and dialectical protocol 
which, of their very nature, are incapable of being definitely resolved. 
There is another, somewhat less invidious dimension to the just-discussed 
similarity between the philosopher and the obsessive-compulsive. Neither the 
philosopher nor the obsessive-compulsive has any real doubts, even of a purely 
intellectual variety, as to the contents of the external world. In any case, neither has any 
more such doubts than the next person. But both are indeed more doubtful than the 
next person. They are more doubtful, and with good reason, as to the contents of the 
internal world. With the both the philosopher and the obsessive-compulsive, their 
supposed doubts about the external world are displaced, projected doubts about the 
internal world. They are both people whose minds are veritable caldrons of primal 
desires but who, being moral, do their best to suppress and repress their basal urges. 
The result is that, while their understanding of the external world is in fact perfectly 
good, notwithstanding their asseverations to their contrary, they are quite in the dark as 
to the internal world, believing or half-believing themselves to be logic-driven, Cartesian 
ratiocinators, when, in fact, their Cartesianism is only a veneer, which holds only of the 
thinnest and most uppermost mental stratum of theirs, the rest of their respective 
psyches being Nietzschean cesspools. 
And both of these types of people fancy themselves ‘rational actors’—people 
who have gotten the better of the base side of themselves---when in reality they are 
anything but rational actors, the truth being that they are driven by rage, narcissism and 
fear. Indeed, their intellectualism is a reaction to, and attempt to cloak their own darkly 
retrograde psychological condition. 
 And their insistence on the rationality of man is merely an idealization—a 
projection of a self-image that they half-have and are 100% trying to have. And the 
Lockean/Cartesian insistence on the non-existence of the unconscious—on the brazenly 
spurious idea that mind extends only as far consciousness---is merely another 
tendentious rationalization, and a decidedly more sterile and superficial one than their 
false, but not entirely misconceived insistence on the primacy within people of 
rationality. 
There is a second similarity between the obsessive-compulsive and the 
philosopher. They are both pathologically concerned with ethics—with questions of 
right and wrong and good vs. evil. In both cases, this is because they are crypto-
criminals—people whose fundamental orientation with respect to others is anti-social—
this being reflected in their solipsism and skepticism---but who also have strong, nay 
draconian, superegos and thus do everything in their power to suppress their criminal 
side. And to this end they enlist their pre-existing penchant for dwelling on technicalities 
of logic; which, when transferred from the sphere of knowledge-theory into the domain 
of ethics, results in their dwelling on technicalities of a legalistic nature. And this is why 
many an obsessive-compulsive, and also many a philosopher, goes into law. 
Philosophers tend to be extremely sensitive to, and intelligent about, niceties of 
language. This is obviously true of some obsessive-compulsives, but it is unknown 
whether it is categorically true of them. But supposing that it is, this, I think, is a 
derivative of their fear-based retreat from the external world, which is the realm of 
action, into the internal world, which is the realm of thought. After all, sensitivity to 
linguistic niceties being cut from much the same cloth as sensitivity to logical niceties, 
and the latter being, as we have already seen, a by-product of the philosopher’s and the 
obsessive-compulsives replacing of reality with cognitive proxies thereof. 
One last point: I have noticed that a hugely disproportionate number of 
philosophers, including myself, are professional level musicians. Around 40% of 
philosophy professors fall into this category. I don’t know whether the same is true of 
the class of obsessive compulsives—it presumably isn’t. But even though there is not, in 
all likelihood, a categorical connection between OCD and musicality, there may be a 
sub-categorical connection, as in, there may be a relatively comprehensive sub-set of 
the class of obsessive-compulsives whose members are also musical and whose being 
musical is connected to their OCD. In any case, it seems that musicianship and 
philosophical ability are related in that both involve decrypting and then re-encrypting 
information; they are both about organizing information—and doing so with obsessional 
concern for the logical interrelations holding among bits of information organized, and a 
proportionate disregard for the correspondence of that information to external reality. 
 
